zlib header fiels in Makefile.in.  I've been burned several times because
objects did not get rebuilt when header files changed.

couldn't find some of them (especially <fnmatch.h>, because it wasn't
looking in the current directory).  The header files are included better
from ../rsync.h.

FNM_PATHNAME flag (to stop at slashes in path names) was not working.

Ironically, the bug in glibc's fnmatch was reported on the rsync mailing
list in late October, and rsync's configure.in was changed to detect the
bad glibc and use the internal fnmatch, but the internal fnmatch was based
on the same buggy glibc!

than skipping it and thus not updating it.  For example, the ownership or
mode on a file may prevent opening it, but the directory may still be
writable so the file could be completely replaced.

the file if the file has the setuid or setgid bits set as the chown
has a side effect of removing the setuid and setgid bits.
we re-do the stat in this case

was not preserving group permisions.  Bug was introduced March 1 in
version 1.100 of rsync.c with an error in re-ordering of the boolean
expressions.  In order to completely preserve the earlier semantics,
change_gid should depend on "(am_root || !am_daemon)", but I don't see why
group ownership should behave differently in a non-root daemon.

using all the mode bits of the existing file rather than just the permissions,
including the file type.

thanks to taver@otenet.gr

this makes sure that the write never blocks.

io.c). Thanks to Theo for pointing out this brokenness.

copy. This makes us match GNU cp more closely.

andrewdagger@xerox.gbr.com)

added note about multiple excludes per exclude option

so the check for dry_run and CHECK_RO are not done when flags is O_RDONLY.
Only do the adding of O_BINARY, which was the intention.

thanks to Dave for pointing this out.

preserve_perms is off.

it is equivalent to --partial --progress

working correctly.

and O_BINARY

Suggested by Roger Price <rprice@cs.uml.edu>

from Bob Edwards

One is a note that a leading "/" in a symlink target will not behave
exactly as if a chroot had occurred, but I decided it wasn't worth the
making it the same.

The other is note about an extra harmless trailing "." that is added under
some rare circumstances.

    1. The file paths being sent and received were not "sanitized" to
	ensure that there weren't any ".." components that would escape the
	top level directory.  This can't happen with the standard rsync
	client, but it could be exploited on both read and write if someone
	modified an rsync client.  This fix sanitizes all incoming and
	outgoing paths when "use chroot = no".

    2. If a module is also "read only = no", clients could have created
	symbolic links with ".." components that would allow writing
	outside of the module.  This could happen with the standard rsync
	client.  This fix sanitizes all incoming symbolic link targets
	when "use chroot = no".

Previously, only top-level paths (anything passed in command line arguments)
were sanitized.  Sorry, I didn't think about the individual file paths
before now.

Matti Aarnio)

comparing checksums for the --checksum (-c) option.

rsync servers via a web proxy (useful for getting through firewalls)

catches most sorts of io errors and ensures we report a error in our
exit status.