- 10 Jan, 2000 3 commits
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David Dykstra authored
zlib header fiels in Makefile.in. I've been burned several times because objects did not get rebuilt when header files changed.
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David Dykstra authored
couldn't find some of them (especially <fnmatch.h>, because it wasn't looking in the current directory). The header files are included better from ../rsync.h.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 07 Jan, 2000 1 commit
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David Dykstra authored
FNM_PATHNAME flag (to stop at slashes in path names) was not working. Ironically, the bug in glibc's fnmatch was reported on the rsync mailing list in late October, and rsync's configure.in was changed to detect the bad glibc and use the internal fnmatch, but the internal fnmatch was based on the same buggy glibc!
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- 06 Jan, 2000 2 commits
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David Dykstra authored
than skipping it and thus not updating it. For example, the ownership or mode on a file may prevent opening it, but the directory may still be writable so the file could be completely replaced.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
the file if the file has the setuid or setgid bits set as the chown has a side effect of removing the setuid and setgid bits. we re-do the stat in this case
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- 29 Dec, 1999 3 commits
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David Dykstra authored
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David Dykstra authored
was not preserving group permisions. Bug was introduced March 1 in version 1.100 of rsync.c with an error in re-ordering of the boolean expressions. In order to completely preserve the earlier semantics, change_gid should depend on "(am_root || !am_daemon)", but I don't see why group ownership should behave differently in a non-root daemon.
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David Dykstra authored
using all the mode bits of the existing file rather than just the permissions, including the file type.
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- 09 Dec, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 03 Dec, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 02 Dec, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
thanks to taver@otenet.gr
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- 23 Nov, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
this makes sure that the write never blocks.
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- 15 Nov, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
io.c). Thanks to Theo for pointing out this brokenness.
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- 08 Nov, 1999 4 commits
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rsync-bugs authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
copy. This makes us match GNU cp more closely.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
andrewdagger@xerox.gbr.com) added note about multiple excludes per exclude option
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- 04 Nov, 1999 1 commit
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David Dykstra authored
so the check for dry_run and CHECK_RO are not done when flags is O_RDONLY. Only do the adding of O_BINARY, which was the intention.
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- 01 Nov, 1999 2 commits
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Andrew Tridgell authored
thanks to Dave for pointing this out.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 31 Oct, 1999 6 commits
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Andrew Tridgell authored
preserve_perms is off.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
it is equivalent to --partial --progress
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 27 Oct, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
working correctly.
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- 25 Oct, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
and O_BINARY
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- 19 Oct, 1999 1 commit
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David Dykstra authored
Suggested by Roger Price <rprice@cs.uml.edu>
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- 06 Sep, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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- 30 Aug, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
from Bob Edwards
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- 09 Jul, 1999 2 commits
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David Dykstra authored
One is a note that a leading "/" in a symlink target will not behave exactly as if a chroot had occurred, but I decided it wasn't worth the making it the same. The other is note about an extra harmless trailing "." that is added under some rare circumstances.
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David Dykstra authored
1. The file paths being sent and received were not "sanitized" to ensure that there weren't any ".." components that would escape the top level directory. This can't happen with the standard rsync client, but it could be exploited on both read and write if someone modified an rsync client. This fix sanitizes all incoming and outgoing paths when "use chroot = no". 2. If a module is also "read only = no", clients could have created symbolic links with ".." components that would allow writing outside of the module. This could happen with the standard rsync client. This fix sanitizes all incoming symbolic link targets when "use chroot = no". Previously, only top-level paths (anything passed in command line arguments) were sanitized. Sorry, I didn't think about the individual file paths before now.
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- 27 Jun, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
Matti Aarnio)
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- 26 Jun, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
comparing checksums for the --checksum (-c) option.
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- 13 Apr, 1999 1 commit
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Andrew Tridgell authored
rsync servers via a web proxy (useful for getting through firewalls)
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- 06 Apr, 1999 3 commits
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rsync-bugs authored
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Andrew Tridgell authored
catches most sorts of io errors and ensures we report a error in our exit status.
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Andrew Tridgell authored
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